At the present time this self, the ‘Someone’ scenario, is being challenged by two very different forces. On the one hand, an increasingly pervasive information technology coupled with an ever more invasive biotechnology, is leading to a culture of passivity and hedonism that obliterates the individual altogether: the ‘Nobody’ scenario. On the other hand, as never before, fundamentalism is suppressing the uniqueness of the individual, and imposing a collective narrative: the ‘Anyone’ scenario. If the only two possibilities are indeed loss of private identity to technology, or its suppression to a collective public an obvious and urgent question, is: what other alternative might there be for the human race?I shall argue that being an individual ‘Someone’ is the most pivotal feature of our lives, and one worth preserving: so, we must find an alternative not only to obliteration by technology (Nobody) or suppression by fundamentalism (Anyone), but also a means of becoming a unique individual other than via an unfettered materialism that merely turns out to leave the consumer unfulfilled, dissatisfied, and depressed (1). We shall see, finally that there might be the possibility of redefining our identity, not through the traditional routes of ownership and status,- but through another strategy altogether.

Let’s start with Someone’s Mind. For a neuroscientist, the old dualism of ‘mental’ and ‘physical’, of indeed ‘mind’ and ‘brain’, is as unhelpful as it is misleading. After all, the neurosciences are currently starting to breach the traditional firewall of ‘thought’ and ‘mental’ events. One example is of a study (2) involving three groups of adult volunteers, none of whom could play the piano. The ‘control’ group, as always given the least exciting role, merely co-existed in the same room as a piano for the experimental sessions spanning over five days. However the second group were taught to practice five-finger piano exercises: incredibly, even over the short period of the study, their daily brain scans showed a significant change in functional brain territory related to the movement of their digits, compared with the scans of the controls. But the most astonishing effect of all occurred with the third group: in this case, the subjects were not actually required to play the piano physically, but instead to imagine that they were executing the exercises. Quite remarkably, the scans of this group were almost indistinguishable from those actually engaged in piano playing. Here then is surely an example of a ‘thought’ or ‘mental event’ having virtually the same effect (modification of neuronal circuitry) as a physical one (piano playing).

Just as a mental event can have the same effect as a physical one, so a mental event, a thought, can actually have an effect on the physical world. In a recent report from Emory University (3), a quadriplegic patient received an implant into his brain containing a chemical, ‘nerve growth factor (NGF)’. As its name suggests, NGF attracts neurons, brain cells, to grow towards a target, -in this case the electrode. Accordingly, once this process was completed after several months in the brain of the Emory patient, the neurons then hooked up with the electronic components of the electrode.

Strange though it might sound, this carbon-silicon interfacing occurs quite readily. Neurons are superbly efficient electronic components: they have had the whole of evolution to become so, to develop the properties required to generate the minute and varied voltages that they use for signalling to each other. Moreover carbon (an essential part of all living matter) and silicon (the mainstay material of the integrated circuit) are actually first cousins on the Periodic Table. It might come as know surprise then, that neurons can now actually be grown on integrated circuits, forming the prototype for what, in the future, might be regarded as a workaday ‘neurochip’ (4).

In any event, the paralysed patient at Emory, who continues to have no movement capabilities below his neck, can now ‘will’ a cursor on a computer screen. Comparable studies in non-paralysed rats and monkeys now show the animals ‘willing’ a robotic arm to move to achieve a certain task, rather than physically exerting their own muscles to gain the same reward. There is clear potential here for paralysed patients: but whilst any implications for abusing this system and sending in the e-mail directly might, in theory, be worthy of discussion,- the practical prerequisite of the brain surgery needed first, must surely consign such a scenario to the realms of science-fiction. But the issue remains: the brain sciences are now demonstrating that there is no distinction between mental and physical events, that every thought has a physical correlate, even if we understand poorly as yet the precise nature of that correlation, and even more remotely, its causal relationship.

For more than 50,000 years, this astonishing ‘plasticity’,- the dynamism of our neuronal circuitry, has been personalised into an individual ‘mind’ by a combination of genes, culture, and personal experience. Only four weeks following the fertilization of an egg, a baby born has had their brain shaped, almost literally, via changes in the dynamic configurations of neuronal connections, by the incessant interaction of genes, factors in the micro-environment of the brain, and in turn by events and happenstance in the wider, external world. Contrary to some current common dogma, the genes do not set an autocratic agenda.

For example, a study published a few years ago (5) showed that mice genetically engineered to have the murine equivalent of the hereditary movement disorder Huntington’s Chorea, could nonetheless be affected by exposure to an ‘enriched’ environment of ladders, wheels and so on. Despite the fact that in Huntington’s Chorea, unusually for a CNS dysfunction, only one gene was at fault, the mice exposed to the more stimulating conditions showed a far more modest impairment, and a far later onset, of the poor movements: even therefore, in the case of a single rogue gene, the interaction with the environment is the key determining issue.

Genes are necessary but not sufficient players in determining the individual chemical and anatomical landscape of each individual brain. The activation, the switching on of a gene, will result in the manufacture of a protein. However we now know that this simple cause and effect is actually far from simple. Even in the humble fruit fly, the activation of one gene can result in any of 38,000 different proteins. Moreover, that protein does not have a ‘function’ locked away inside it. Rather, the critical factor is how that protein in turn works within the circuitry of the brain to change the communication between certain neurons,- an event that in turn will lead to sequential changes in the dynamics of ever larger networks of brain cells that constitute a whole brain region. In turn it is this personalisation of the brain through the incessant realignment and shifts in power of neuronal connections, that constitutes the ‘mind’ (6), - the unique perspective that comes from becoming a Someone. If we have individual experiences that literally leave their mark on the brain, then we become individuals. Moreover, our species is unique in the animal kingdom for interpreting the moment to moment experiences of daily existence in terms of an individual journey from birth to death,- a life narrative predicated on the notion of a self-conscious self that provides the basic conceptual framework for giving a meaning to life.

But sometimes we lose our minds: we are not always self-conscious, aware of ourselves as an entity distinct from others. A fascinating aspect of the human condition, is occasional abrogation of being Someone. Infants are comparable to non-human animals in that they lack self-consciousness which only develops with the onset of language in the second and third years of life (7). Until that time, the child’s brain is maximally receptive to any input: only as they start to accumulate sufficient past experiences to evaluate new events in terms of what has happened to them already, only then does the interaction of brain and environment become a two-way street, and the ‘mind’ start to flourish. However there are ways in which adult human beings can recapitulate the booming, buzzing confusion of the small child: various normal, abnormal, and disease conditions can, in diverse ways, lead to the comparable brain-state of a child: fast-paced sports, drugs, or schizophrenia offer respective examples in ways of blocking access to the personalized brain connections. In the case of sports, the sensations per se and the speed at which one momentary experience is superseded by the next, will mitigate against the slow spread of idiosyncratic associations through personalized, indirect connections. Drugs will work directly on those connections to impair appropriate functioning, whilst schizophrenia causes an imbalance in the naturally occurring chemicals (8).

These states, -childhood, drugs, sport, and psychosis, - are all obviously very different. But they have in common a crucial, final characteristic: the personalised ‘mind’ does not operate, - access to the personalised brain connections is suspended. In the case of the adult then, it is not that the physical connections are absent, as with the small child, but rather that the neuronal connections themselves malfunction (drugs/psychosis) or the pure sensory stimulus over-rides any personal ‘significance’ (raves/music/wine/food/orgasm) and often occurs as such a rapid succession of events that there is no time for the full connectivity (‘meaning’) to be realised, as in fast-paced sports. A further example of ‘letting oneself go’ and ‘losing one’s mind’ in this way, comes from dreaming, itself indistinguishable from psychoses such as schizophrenia (6). In the psychotic brain, the basic problem is a change in levels of the naturally occurring transmitters that would, in turn, impair the normal mechanisms of neurotransmission and hence the full functional connectivity that constitutes the ‘mind’.

In all cases, the common factors are loss of self-consciousness, extreme sensuality, high emotion, and loss of ability to reason. This respite from being Someone, except for the extreme example of psychosis (6), seems desirable as an intermittent state: it is an interesting paradox of human beings, that on the one hand we strive to earn money to pay for experiences of wine, women and song, of drugs and sex and rock and roll, -yet at the same time shun engaging in such ‘sensational’ activities all the time, in favour of retaining our self-conscious identities.

However, for most of the time, our adult human minds, our personalised brains, provide the appropriate checks and balances that enable us to make sense of the world, a world where objects and people have varying degrees of ‘significance’ or ‘meaning’ to us, in accordance with the number of associations they invoke from past experience. We evaluate the world in terms of what we have experienced previously and conversely everything that happens will change, however slightly, that personal view. I have argued that it is an essential part of being human to have this unique life story, -and be conscious of it: however only relatively recently has the potential for this Someone been so realised, acknowledged, and emphasised. With the dawn of the 19th Century a host of socio-economic factors such as the Industrial Revolution, growth in technologies, rise of middle classes, and social mobility has led to a much stronger emphasis on the potential for a unique Someone to flourish. Until that time, the life narrative of our ancestors was far less highly personalised, and much more constrained by circumstances of birth, profession of father, prevailing religion, and strict social mores. For the last two centuries, however, this deterministic option has become increasingly non-tenable as we have become increasingly unique and private individuals. Interestingly enough this rise and rise of the Someone scenario can be reflected in the appearance and growth of the novel (9). But the search for a meaningful identity is still continuing: it seems that we are still not truly fulfilled and confident in who we are. The philosopher Alain de Botton has suggested (10), as has the psychologist Oliver Goldsmith (1), that the current dissatisfaction with our identity, lies in status anxiety.

For the past 200 years, the westernised and increasingly egocentric view of life, our personal identity, has been defined in terms of differences to others, our status in a particular society/community. In turn, this sense of a unique self, and the life-story that it is living, are based on how different each one of us is to each other,- hence to our respective status in whatever culture or society one has happened to have been born over the last 50,000 years or so. Accordingly throughout history, we have been able to recognise exclusively human behaviours, ‘Human Nature’, even though the context of that behaviour has been historically, geographically, and culturally disparate.

‘Human Nature’ is so often invoked as an excuse, a reason, or an answer when logic and reason fail. However, it is a term that is rarely defined and actually hard to understand. After all, ‘Human’ disenfranchises all other species in the animal kingdom, whilst ‘Nature’ suggests it is ubiquitous in time and space. Envy, for example, can be immediately recognized in Ancient Greek history and literature, even though the object of that envy, the cultural context of values, is so different to our own.

I’m going to suggest that these exclusively human behaviours can be interpreted in terms of the Seven Deadly Sins: in each case, the behaviour has transcended its original biological function to symbolise something essential about us as individuals, and hence our relative status to each other. If the sins are the behaviours through which we each establish our unique identity,- then it follows that they would have been/are perceived as undesirable, ‘deadly’ in societies where, and in times when, the significance and nurturing of individual identity has not been paramount. Conversely, in contemporary societies where the individual identity is encouraged, the significance and dread of sin, is greatly diminished. A central idea then is that, surprisingly, Human Nature might best be explained by recourse to the Seven Deadly Sins, - and perhaps more surprisingly still, that the sins themselves are actually phenomena that can be explored from a new perspective, that of the neurobiologist.

But if ‘Human Nature’ and the individual identity are both derived from the sins, where do they differ? Because differ they do: ‘Human Nature’ is a constant factor in all our societies, whilst we have just seen that the relevance of Someone can vary according to each culture, reaching its most prominent in modern western society. The answer is that the two terms differ in quantity not quality, that individual identity is an extreme example of Human Nature taken to its limits, in the unfettered exercise of status through the Seven Deadly Sins. Each specific sin can be interpreted as behaviours for establishing individual status, and hence one’s own identity, in our current society.

For example, all non-human animals (leaving aside the special and arguably artificial case of overindulged pets) consume just the right quantity of food to balance their energy expenditure. However among us humans, under- or over-eating (the Sin of Gluttony) has become symbolic of something else, that in turn reflects your status, - how others see you, and how you see yourself. The most basic sign of friendship is to share a meal: companion and its French and Spanish counterparts copain and companeros literally mean a sharer of bread. Or, we may indulge in ‘comfort’ eating purely for the strong sensual experience of taste, smell, and texture that diverts from the more personally significant ‘cognitive’ disappointments of the outside world. Meanwhile the same sensory indulgence that food offers will mean in more religious contexts, that the rejection of food can be viewed a symbol of the devout. The symbolism of eating and the significance of its consequences can also be seen in the western obsession with dieting and the serious implications of bulimia and anorexia testifying to the low-status of the obese in the USA and UK, whilst in certain Afro-Caribbean cultures fatness brings respect.

When it comes to the Sin of Lust, the sex-act, and in particular the preludes to it, have been high-jacked for other, less obviously biological and more symbolic purposes: the rock-star surrounded by the bevy of female fans, the pride that many men take in ‘being seen’ with an attractive companion, are blatant signs of status. Paradoxically, however, the circumstances that accompany successful copulation, -orgasm often aided by music and drugs, will actually temporarily obliterate a sense of self as one ‘drowns’ in a sea of strong sensations and ‘blows/loses the mind’, ‘let’s oneself go’ (6).

Rather the predisposing events, such as falling in love and establishing a conspicuous relationship are the less sensory, more cognitive ways in which we assert a sense of self, of self-fulfilment, and of status. Romantic love ie often unrequited love, could be seen as an extreme example of expression of the individual and their personal life narrative. Irrespective of whether other species exhibit pair-bonding, there is no evidence, most notably absent in chimps, of anything resembling romance, -a sustained courtship with often an unfulfilled outcome. In this regard, it is telling that the notion of romantic love features less in more fundamentalist (‘Anyone’) societies. Similarly, the ‘Nobody’ scenario of technology might be about to weaken the current importance of romantic love on our lives. Already 3 year olds in the UK, allegedly, are needing lessons in conversation skills, since so much time is usually spent instead in communication with and via a screen. Perhaps it would not be so far-fetched a possibility to imagine a time, not so far off, when the whole idea of messy, face to face interaction, with its pheromones, body language, immediacy and above all unpredictability are an unpalatable alternative to a remote, off-line, sanitised and far more onanistic cyber persona and life.

The Sin of Sloth offers as an obvious antidote to the current obsession with ‘stress’ and ‘work-life balance’. Interestingly enough, the act of ‘relaxing’ is an almost exclusively adult behaviour, as an antidote to one’s status being strained and challenged, for example by over-work. In a similar vein, having the time to refrain from working and indulge in conspicuous leisure once again bears a strong relation to status in contemporary society, whilst comparable inactivity is considered as laziness in low status individuals. The behaviour, the lack of activity itself, is not the issue per se, but rather as we saw with obesity the status, or lack of it, that sloth brings, will depend on the cultural context in which it is expressed.

The more materialistic the society the more, I’m suggesting, that Someone, our individual identity, is nurtured: if status depends on certain symbols and symbolic behaviours removed beyond a biological context, -then the Sin of Avarice will be central to sense of self in providing opportunities through the accumulation of money. Money is the ultimate symbol, since it actually is nothing but symbolic: it has no direct biological function and is intrinsically meaningless and worthless. The avaricious accumulation of money for its own sake is the most removed of all the sins from direct biological roots, but at the same time, is the most obvious route to the hijacking of all of them (sex, food, leisure) to increase personal status. By the same token, the Sin of Envy is related indirectly yet widely to the misuse of biological functions to promote a fulfilled sense of being Someone. If an individual identity is based on sustaining competitive differences between individuals, then those of lower status will inevitably act in ways that reflect a wish to redress the imbalance.

The Sin of Vanity can be interpreted, within the arguments of this essay, in several ways. Perhaps the most obvious is where the self is realised and expressed particularly in the individual face, and in physical terms generally. Beauty universally is rooted in health and youth, clear symbols of readiness and ability to reproduce, and hence of value in society. Moreover, vanity is not simply skin-deep. More profoundly, and more than any other sin, vanity is predicated on a strong sense of Someone with individual, superior attributes. Just as with avarice and gluttony, so once again, the more fundamentalist the ideology, the more vanity will be reviled. But what might be the consequences of high technological advances in the beauty industry that increasingly democratise beauty and inevitably standardise appearances? Indeed, if we are communicating behind a screen for most of the time, adopting artificial cyber-personas, -then could the Nobody scenario of technology have the same effect as the Anyone perspective?

Although all animals will display aggression when there is a clear survival issue, only humans show unwarranted aggression in situations that do not endanger physical well-being in any way: the Sin of Anger. Anger occurs when not life itself, but rather status, is perceived as threatened: obvious examples of this sin would be road rage, drunken brawls, or domestic violence. In the middle of the 20th Century, Paul MaClean argued that mass violent behaviours were due to the unhooking of our more civilised ‘neo-mammalian’ brain regions from the more primitive ‘reptilean’ regions that allowed indiscriminate expression of violence (11). Contrary to the idea of an unfettered, literally mind-less reptilean brain at large, football violence can be interpreted differently, -not as an abrogation of our private, personal identity, but more as a result of a public, collective narrative, - an outrage for a collective cause.

To summarise the Someone scenario: we are currently charting a life narrative that enforces the notion of a private individual but in a way that gives no experience of sensational, raw excitement. Hence the growth in our current culture, of ever more extreme pastimes involving fast paced sports, drugs, food/drink, and sex. Moreover, even the notion that individuality can be satisfactorily defined by status appears to fail, as witnessed by the increase in depression and anxiety. This form of identity is private, but not fulfilled.

So what are the alternatives? The last 100 years has witnessed a growth in aggressive fundamentalism, from the doctrines of Communism and the Nazis, to certain cults and radical Islam. However, as we have seen, this mass aggression is not the same as some atavistic, purposeless reptilian urge (11), but rather part of a meaningful, albeit collective, narrative for a group of people unified by an all-pervasive ideology or religion. In fact, there are clear parallels between the storyline of the aspiring Someone of current western society and the Public Someone of fundamentalism. However the choice of sins is different. Whereas western values place more premium for the private Someone on lust, gluttony, avarice, sloth, vanity, and envy, -the collective status of fundamentalism, of a public identity, could not be so easily be defined by these conduits. The narrative of the public Someone, from the Nazis to Al Qaeda, is much more readily a David-and-Goliath storyline. Perhaps the violence seen, for example on 9/11, was not an act of primeval, ‘mindless’ aggression with territorial analogies in the animal kingdom, but rather a bid for higher status, in turn a means of asserting an identity, albeit a collective one. For the public Someone, anger is the most obvious and easiest means for defining identity: ‘Men’s collective passions are always evil’, warned Bertram Russell. This option therefore offers the necessary excitement, as we have seen for fast paced sports, raves, drugs, and sex: but this time the individual is not simply temporarily put on the back-burner. Rather individual identity is sublimated permanently to a collective, albeit gripping narrative. This form of identity might therefore be fulfilling, but is not private.

The third and final option currently available to us, is prompted by the astonishing impact of the latest pervasive and now invasive biotechnology, information technology, and nanotechnology: the Nobody scenario. As already described elsewhere more fully (12), it is possible that now for the first time, Human Nature could be obliterated in favour of a passive state, reacting to a flood of incoming sensations, - a ‘Yuck-and-Wow’ mentality characterised by a premium on the raw senses and momentary experience as the chemical landscape of the brain shifts into one where personalised brain connectivity is either not functional, or absent altogether. Although this option offers the excitement of sensational experience, it has obliterated that valuable narrative of personal identity. I have predicted (12) that we are facing a possible society where status no longer matters because we no longer define ourselves as separate entities: rather information-, bio-, and nanotechnologies will challenge our traditional means of individual demarcation, - from the traditional firewall of our physical bodies and brains to our notions of external ‘reality’, to third party access to our innermost body processes, to homogenization of generations through reproductive technologies, to a blurring of the daily narrative of work and leisure, - in short the notion of the traditional, unique life-story that opened this essay. Instead we will revert to being permanently in the sensationalist here-and-now, literally mind-less. This form of identity is neither private, nor fulfilled.

So far, the central argument has been that it is difference relative to others, i.e. status, that is important for defining our individuality and that such status can currently only be derived by the exercise of the Seven Deadly Sins. This scenario holds true for both the private, individual identity that has been so strongly developed in the 20th Century, as well as the comparable public collective identity of the more modern fundamentalist, regimes and cults. The current conflict of western societies, in particular the USA, with fundamentalism could be viewed as a struggle between these two types of identity - a private Someone versus a public Someone. If the public Someone prevails, the dominant ‘sin’ may well be a continual and extreme anger, whilst the private Someone might in any event be jeopardised by a sanitising and homogenizing raft of high technologies. If these are the only two possible outcomes, -loss of private identity to technology, or its suppression to a substitute public counterpart, and if private identity is explicable in terms of the Seven Deadly Sins, -then perhaps sin as we know it, will soon cease to exist. However, for the purposes of this essay, the central question with which we are left, is whether Human Nature, as defined here as predicated on status, could evolve in a way that survived fundamentalism (Anyone) and technology (Nobody) respectively, but by being independent of external status symbols (Someone).

Perhaps we need to develop a means of ‘internal’ status, where the self could in some way gain a sense of being unique, but independent of a relation based on aspiring superiority to the appearance, belongings, and behaviour of others. An alternative way in which a human being can feel a strong sense of their individuality, is when they have a new insight, or idea, -make a connection that has never been made before. Not only are such ‘eureka moments’ extremely stimulating, they also reinforce the feeling that you are special because only you have had a certain thought. Unfortunately, such moments are rare, and certainly not in everyone’s repertoire. Indeed, as the 21st Century unfolds, we are increasingly concerned about the decline in creativity in our education and society.

If we were able to understand more of the underlying neuroscience of creativity, then perhaps we could shape, via the all-pervasive and burgeoning technologies, a society and culture that encouraged the mind-set of a ‘Eureka’ experience. However, until recently, it has not been obvious where to start to understand the creative process in neuronal terms. Surely, it is not sufficient to invoke the mind-sets of drug-takers or the mentally ill (e.g. Van Gogh) to ‘explain’ creativity: after all, not all drug takers and the mentally ill are creative, nor conversely do all artists, writers, and composers necessarily suffer mental illness or take drugs. However perhaps that mindless mind-set that characterises, but is not exclusive to, the drug taker, the raver, the psychotic, or indeed the child, - is a prerequisite for de-constructing the world, and with it accepted ways of viewing, understanding it. The first stage in fostering creativity then, could be to devise ways for dismantling the most obvious and accepted of connections between words/colours/shapes/ideas.

But a child’s painting is no work of art. The next step would then be to bring together elements, be they word, colours, shapes or facts that have never been linked before: but again, this is insufficient, as witnessed in many drug-taker’s meaningless ramblings. The critical third issue,- the necessary and sufficient condition,- is that the new combination of colours/words/ideas triggers new extensive connections: new ‘meaningful’ associations in both the creator, and ideally, others. We see the world, thanks to the creation, in a new way because new, and extensive (‘meaningful’) associations have formed in our brains, triggered by these novel juxtaposition of previously disparate elements.

Until now, such acts of creation have been the province of those skilled at certain media, -music, art and/or those predisposed to rarefied ways of thinking, as characterises the poet, the philosopher or the Nobel Prize-winning scientist. However perhaps ‘Eureka moments’ might be more possible, more frequently among more people, if we could devise ways to predispose the brain into working in accordance with the steps mentioned above. The late Carl Sagan, an astronomer, once said:

‘It is suicide to live in a society dependent on science and technology, where virtually no one knows anything about science and technology’. As we contemplate a society inseparable from a remorseless march of technology, we should surely be exploring how the inevitable transformations in how we think, feel and learn, in education therefore, as well as the goods and services of the mid-21st Century, could be geared to optimising these mental processes. This form of identity would be both private AND fulfilling!

Acknowledgement

Susan Greenfield is Director of the Oxford Centre for the Science of the Mind, funded by the Templeton Foundation
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